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Abstract—Security and privacy in vehicular communication
are expected to be ensured by the pervasive use of pseudonymous
certificates and signed messages. The design and establishment
of necessary public key infrastructure and hierarchies of cer-
tificate authorities is ongoing in industry consortia, such as
the Car-to-Car Communication Consortium. The privacy pre-
serving dissemination of pseudonymous certificates is however
still expected to be limited to single-hop exchanges between
vehicles. This limitation to one-hop strategies might not be ideal,
especially considering the importance of ensuring trustworthy
stateless information exchange upon reception of the very first
communication packets. We propose to investigate multi-hop pre-
distribution strategies for certificates to significantly reduce this
first encounter problem.
I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK
A core requirement for effective vehicular communication
is secure information exchange between vehicles. As the
volatility of vehicular networks makes stable secure channels
impractical, the commonly accepted solution for inter vehicle
communication (V2V) is to use authenticated messages, based
on a common vehicular public key infrastructure (PKI) and ac-
credited certificate authorities (CA). Relevant standardization
efforts at ETSI [1] and IEEE [2] have proposed appropriate
protocols to implement such architectures. In order to addi-
tionally assure privacy for the passengers of vehicles in such
architectures it is foreseen to issue multiple pseudonymous
identities to vehicles, which can be switched according to given
rulesets. The goal of providing multiple pseudonymous iden-
tities to vehicles is to provide location privacy to passengers.
The dissemination of certificates to vehicles is indirectly
specified in ETSI and IEEE by means of direct inclusion
of certificates in signed messages or through the possibility
to explicit requests the inclusion of certificates. There are
no universal rules that define the inclusion or omission of
certificates, but the fact that certificates represent a significant
amount of data makes it attractive to minimize the amount
of certificate inclusions while maximizing the service quality.
Service quality in this context is the ability to verify incoming
messages of previously unknown vehicles as fast as possible.
Waiting periods for exchanges of certificates after the first
encounter of a vehicle in communication range need to be
minimized. Existing research and suggestions in relevant stan-
dardization effort limit themselves to one-hope dissemination.
PKI systems, such as S/MIME [3], rely on similarly boot-
strapping secure communication through an initial exchange
of certificates between communication partners over not-yet-
secured channels or messages. In case a communication partner
is not available for the initial exchange of certificates it is
possible to use a third party cache of certificates. This is
possible because the trust in certificates does not depend on
secure delivery but instead is solely hinged on (a chain or set
of) trust anchors that certify the authenticity of the enclosed
public keys. The concept of public cache server is popular
for the related PGP/MIME [4] system, where keyservers are
commonly relied on to deliver public key material along
with cross certifications added by third party entities for the
formation of a web-of-trust.
Communication system operating on public internet infras-
tructure can be expected have relatively stable connections and
to tolerate varying amounts of latency to complete such an
initial exchange of certificates to bootstrap secure communi-
cation. No matter if it is done end-to-end between endpoints or
using caches located in keyservers. Vehicular communication
on the other hand operates under more constrained conditions
and under stricter requirements. Hidden station effect can
prevent two way communication, the reachability of caches
in RSUs or backend infrastructure (V2I) can not be assumed
at all times, and the availability of certificate material must
be guaranteed within reasonable latencies with respect to the
beacon frequency and the relative trajectories of the moving
vehicles.
Within the specific constraints of vehicular communication
patterns, it is still possible to envision protocols that use caches
for more effective dissemination of certificates. Also, another
way to investigate dissemination of certificates beyond 1-hop
neighborhood is to adapt protocols that propose to disseminate
neighbor information through 2-hop piggybacking [5]. Such
protocols have been specifically proposed for purposes of dis-
tributed congestion control (DCC) in vehicular communication
networks. Both approaches will be investigated using analytical
models to predict the suitability of these approaches to enhance
the efficiency and effectiveness of certificate distribution in
VANETs.
II. REQUIREMENTS
Pseudonymous certificates are the foundation for both
security and privacy in vehicular communication networks.
Vehicles are expected to locally cache at least a small set
of certificates to have the capability to immediately verify
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the messages of all nearby vehicles even if the (chain of)
relevant certificates are not included in every message. This
can occur when a signed message only includes the digest of
a certificate instead of the full (chain of) certificates in order
to save bandwidth.
For the purpose of our analysis we assume that the size of
a single certificate including compressed NIST P-256 ECDSA
keys is 140 bytes [6]. One GiB of storage space could
store approximately 7.669.584 certificates. Considering that in
Europe alone an estimated number of more than 250 million
vehicles are in use it becomes immediately obvious that pre-
distributing all certificates is not a realistic option. A global
estimate of motor vehicle registrations indicated about 1 billion
vehicles in 2010. Assuming each vehicle would be equipped
with a set of 100.000 pseudonyms to cover every possible 5
minute period over the course of a full year yields and upper
estimate of 100 trillion pseudonymous identities. Storing this
amount of pseudonyms would require about 12 EiB of storage.
We assume as a requirement for our analysis that a vehicles
on-board unit (OBU) are limited to a maximum of 1GiB of
storage space for caches of certificate material.
Another requirement exists relative to a baseline of band-
width consumption for the simple inclusion of certificates in
every message sent by vehicles. For the purpose of our study
we only investigate periodic beacon messages. Combined with
a synthetic channel model and estimates of average vehicles
densities this allows us to calculate probabilities for channel
load and packet loss under various protocols. To derive mean-
ingful metrics of application level service quality, we calculate
the expected awareness quality (AQ) [7] for the awareness of
nearby vehicles in a safety relevant area of 300 m around
vehicles. A penalty for increased latency between the first
encounter of a new vehicle and the first successfully verifiable
secured message is implicitly included in the AQ metric. Any
pre-distribution scheme should improve the AQ compared to
the baseline case of including full certificates in all periodic
messages. Ideally, a new pre-distribution scheme would also
provide improved AQ over certificate omission schemes such
as Neighbor-based Certificate Omission [8] and Congestion-
based Certificate Omission [6].
A third requirement for a new pre-distribution scheme is to
not influence the privacy of passengers by not compromising
the unlinkability of pseudonyms used by a vehicle. This is
a relevant aspect due to the basic fact that pre-distribution
will leak the expected future location of vehicles and their
pseudonym. Even under hierarchic, geographic, or temporal
scoping rules, it should be hard for an attacker to link
pseudonyms as belonging to a single vehicle. We assume an
attacker model that matches common expectations of not being
too powerful in terms of network coverage and not being
mobile enough to outright follow a tracked vehicle.
III. SOLUTIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The solution space for certificate pre-distribution can be
partitioned into three broad techniques, all of which will be
augmented with directional scoping:
• n-hop dissemination.
• store-and-forward dissemination.
• probabilistic dissemination.
These techniques emphasize different forwarding methods,
but are essentially all based on pushing information where it
is expected to be needed. The opposite approach of pulling
information that might be needed along a given trajectory
would require the ability to accurately predict the positions
of vehicles that are far outside communication range and to
broadcast pull requests beyond the intended trajectory. Both
aspects are deemed prohibitive for efficient use of the available
communication channels.
To ensure the unlinkability of pseudonyms it seems intu-
itively plausible to not pre-distribute multiple pseudonymous
certificates that belong to the same vehicle, as this creates a
link between the two identities. On the other hand, the model of
an attacker against location privacy assumes that a local mobile
follower can watch pseudonym changes anyway. It is even
possible to argue that the pre-distribution of valid pseudonym
certificates without claiming the actual presence of users of
these certificates enlarges the size of the k-anonymity group
without having a negative effect on the service quality through
an introduction of phantom vehicles.
An attractive opportunity to implement pre-distribution
of certificates in VANETs presents itself in the context of
proposed DCC systems [5]. Such systems optimize channel
utilization by aiming to maintain a constant channel busy ratio
(CBR). A CBR value below the ideal target value can be
interpreted as an indication of unused bandwidth. An optional
service quality enhancement scheme such as pre-distribution
of certificates could be a useful consumer of such unused
bandwidth.
As future work we will develop an analytical model that
allows us to model the AQ of different push dissemination
strategies for certificate pre-distribution, and compare the
effectiveness and efficiency against existing inclusion and
omission schemes. Additionally, we will investigate the impact
of certificate pre-distribution on location privacy and possible
interactions with DCC systems.
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